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Abstract An agent’s beliefs usually depend on informa-
tional or cognitive factors such as observation or received
communication or reasoning, but also affective factors may
play a role. In this paper, by adopting neurological theories
on the role of emotions and feelings, an agent model is
introduced incorporating the interaction between cognitive
and affective factors in believing. The model describes how
the strength of a belief may not only depend on information
obtained, but also on the emotional responses on the belief.
For feeling emotions a recursive body loop between
preparations for emotional responses and feelings is
assumed. The model introduces a second feedback loop for
the interaction between feeling and belief. The strength of a
belief and of the feeling both result from the converging
dynamic pattern modelled by the combination of the two
loops. For some speciﬁc cases it is described, for example,
how for certain personal characteristics an optimistic world
view is generated in the agent’s beliefs, or, for other
characteristics, a pessimistic world view. Moreover, the
paper shows how such affective effects on beliefs can
emerge and become stronger over time due to experiences
obtained. It is shown how based on Hebbian learning a
connection from feeling to belief can develop. As these
connections affect the strenghts of future beliefs, in this
way an effect of judgment ‘by experience built up in the
past’ or ‘by gut feeling’ can be obtained. Some example
simulation results and a mathematical analysis of the
equilibria are presented.
Keywords Believing   Feeling   Hebbian learning   Agent
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Introduction
When by observation or communication information about
the world is acquired, it is often not completely clear and
still subject to interpretation what has to be believed. For
example, if from a distance you see a small paper attached
at the front window of your car, you may start to believe
that you received a charge for parking at the wrong place or
time. Or you may start to believe that it concerns an
advertising of a special offer. In such cases emotional
aspects may become decisive in what you will believe.
Such a process is the focus of the work reported here.
Already during the process that they are generated
beliefs trigger emotional responses that result in certain
feelings. However, the process of generation of a belief is
not fully independent of such associated feelings. In a
reciprocal manner, the generated feelings may also have a
strengthening or weakening effect on the belief during this
process. For example, by Frijda et al. (2000b) it is stated:
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how the individual believes the world to be, how
events are believed to have come about, and what
implications events are believed to have. Beliefs thus
are regarded as one of major determinants of emo-
tion, and therefore an important part of the study of
emotion can properly be seen as falling under the
umbrella of cognitive psychology. Oddly enough,
however, the reverse direction of inﬂuence in the
relation between emotion and cognition has received
scant attention. This is in itself rather odd, because
one midgt easily regard emotions as being among the
determinants of an individual’s beliefs, and their
resistance to modiﬁcation. Indeed, such an inﬂuence
has traditionally been considered to be one of the
most important things to be said about emotions.
Spinoza (1677/1989) deﬁned emotions as ‘‘states that
make the mind inclined to think one thing rather than
another’’. The inﬂuence of emotions upon beliefs can
be vieweed as the port through which emotions exert
their inﬂuence upon human life. (…)
The general proposal thus is that emotions can awa-
ken, intrude into, and shape beliefs, by creating them,
by amplifying or altering them, and by making them
resistant to change.
(Frijda et al. 2000b, pp. 1, 5)
Recent empirical work such as described in, for example,
Eich et al. (2000), Forgas et al. (2005, 2009), Niedenthal
(2007), Schooler and Eich (2000), Winkielman et al.
(2009), reports such types of effects of emotions on beliefs
in experimental contexts (but does not relate them to
neurological ﬁndings or theories).
The area of cognitive neuroscience is developing rap-
idly, thereby exploring possibilities for dynamic modelling
approaches based on neurological knowledge (e.g., Purves
et al. 2008; Gazzaniga 2009; Atmanspacher and Rotter
2008; Majumdar 2007; Dolan 2002; Frijda et al. 2000a;
LaBar and Cabeza 2006; Pessoa 2008; Phelps 2006; Stor-
beck and Clore 2007). In this paper, adopting neurological
theories on emotion and feeling, a computational dynamic
agent model is introduced that models this reciprocal
interaction between feeling and believing. The computa-
tional model, which is based on neurological theories on
the embodiement of emotions as described, for example, in
Damasio (1994, 1996, 1999, 2003) and Winkielman et al.
(2009), describes how the generation of a belief may not
only depend on an (external) informational source, but also
takes into account how the belief triggers an emotional
response that leads to a certain feeling. More speciﬁcally,
in accordance with, for example Damasio (1999, 2003), for
feeling the emotion associated to a belief a converging
recursive body loop is assumed. A second converging
feedback loop introduced in the model, inspired by the
Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio 1994, 1996), involves
the interaction back from the feeling to the belief. Thus,
a combination of two loops is obtained, where connection
strengths within these loops in principle are person-speciﬁc.
Depending on these personal characteristics, from a dynamic
interaction within and between the two loops, an equilibrium
is reached for both the strength of the belief and of the
feeling.
Connectionsfromfeelingstobeliefsare person-dependent
and in fact constitute part of a person’s personality. To illus-
trate the model, in the explanation of the model and simula-
tionsresultsreported,thefollowingexamplescenarioisused.
A person is parking his car for a short time at a place
where this is not allowed. When he comes back, from
somedistanceheobservesthatasmallpaperisattached
at the front window of the car. He starts to generate the
beliefthatthe paper representsa chargetobepaid. This
beliefgeneratesanegativefeeling,which,dependingon
thetypeofpersonality,forthiscasehasanimpactonthe
beliefbystrengtheningit.Comingcloser,somecontours
of the type of paper that is attached become visible. As
these are not clearly recognized as often occurring for a
charge, the person starts to generate a second belief,
namelythatitconcernsanadvertisingofaspecialoffer.
This belief generates a positive feeling which, again
depending onthe type ofpersonality,inthiscasehas an
impact on the latter belief by strengthening it.
Notethatinthiscasetheassumedpersonalityoftheperson
makes that both beliefs associated to negative feelings and
beliefs associated to positive feelings are ampliﬁed. In the
modelsuchspeciﬁcpersonalityaspectseasilycanbechanged
by changing the values of the parameters in the model.
Personality aspects, as represented by certain parameters
in the model, might be assumed given a priori (innate), but
it can be questioned how plausible such an assumption is.
A main focus in this paper is also on how the effect of the
feeling on the belief can emerge over time based on per-
sonal experiences: it is shown how such connections in an
agent model may automatically emerge by a Hebbian
learning mechanism (cf. Hebb 1949; Bi and Poo 2001;
Gerstner and Kistler 2002; Xie and Seung 2003). To model
this, it is assumed that the connection from feeling to belief
initally has strength zero, but due to a Hebbian learning
mechanism over time gets nonzero strength. This means
that the agent learns to strengthen its belief based on a
supporting feeling. As a consequence, when such a feeling
would be absent, the agent’s belief would develop less
strength; the feeling gives it its full strength. This principle
models the idea that during lifetime a person builds up
certain intuitions or gut feelings, and lets these play an
important role in what to (fully) believe and what not to
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123believe. More speciﬁcally, over time events occur in a
person’s life triggering a certain belief, and for each of
these events the person experiences a certain feeling, which
by Hebbian learning strengthens the association between
feeling and belief. As a result in future situations when
such a belief is triggered, the associated feeling is gener-
ated with a certain strength, which can be interpreted as
‘having a gut feeling’, or having a ‘judgement by experi-
ence’ for this belief, where the latter word ‘experience’
may be taken to refer to an accumulation of experienced
feelings over the past events.
In this paper, ﬁrst in ‘‘From believing to feeling and vice
versa’’ Damasio’s theory on the generation of feelings based
on a body loop is brieﬂy introduced. Moreover, the second
loopisintroduced,theonebetweenfeelingandbelief.In‘‘The
computational model for believing and feeling’’ the model is
described in detail. ‘‘Example simulation results of the inter-
actionofbeliefandfeeling’’presentssomesimulationresults.
In ‘‘Learning to believe by feeling’’, the Hebbian learning
model is described, and ‘‘Example simulation results for
learning to believe’’ presents some simulation results of the
resulting adaptive process. In ‘‘Mathematical analysis’’ a
mathematical analysis of the equilibria of the model is pre-
sented. Finally, ‘‘Discussion’’ is a discussion.
From believing to feeling and vice versa
Inthissectiontheinteractionbetweenbelievingandfeelingis
discussed in some more detail from a neurological perspec-
tive, in both directions: from believing to feeling, and from
feeling to believing. The notions of emotion and feeling, and
their relationship are adopted from (Damasio 1999).
From believing to feeling
Damasio (1999, 2003) describes how in a person a belief
state induces emotions felt within this person, as described
by Damasio (1999, 2003); for example:
Even when we somewhat misuse the notion of feeling
– as in ‘‘I feel I am right about this’’ or ‘‘I feel I
cannot agree with you’’—we are referring, at least
vaguely, to the feeling that accompanies the idea of
believing a certain fact or endorsing a certain view.
This is because believing and endorsing cause a
certain emotion to happen. As far as I can fathom,
few if any exceptions of any object or event, actually
present or recalled from memory, are ever neutral in
emotional terms. Through either innate design or by
learning, we react to most, perhaps all, objects with
emotions, however weak, and subsequent feelings,
however feeble. (Damasio 2003, p. 93)
Notice that in Damasio (1999) a distinction is made
between an emotion (or emotional response), which is
considered a preparation for a bodily response triggered by
some cause, and a feeling for this emotion, which is
generated by forming a sensory representation for the body
state induced as an emotional response. Damasio (1999)
explains emotion as follows:
The substrate for the representation of emotions is a
collection of neural dispositions in a number of brain
regions (…) They exist, rather, as potential patterns
of activity arising within neuron ensembles. Once
these dispositions are activated, a number of conse-
quences ensue. On the one hand, the pattern of acti-
vation represents, within the brain, a particular
emotion as ‘neural object’. On the other, the pattern
generates explicit responses that modify both the
state of the body proper and the state of other brain
regions. By so doing, the responses create an emo-
tional state, and at that point, an external observer can
appreciate the emotional engagement of the organism
being observed. (Damasio 1999, p. 79)
Here the substrate for the representation of an (internal)
emotional state is considered a collection of neural
dispositions in the brain, which are activated as a reaction
on a certain stimulus. Once this occurs, it entails modiﬁ-
cation of both the body state (which can be considered as
an expressed, externally observable emotional state), and
the state of other brain regions. By these events, an
emotional state is created which is accessible for external
observation; this state may have multiple facets or
dimensions. In schematic form, emotion generation and
feeling the emotion via a body loop roughly proceeds
according to the following causal chain; see Damasio
(1999, 2003):
belief ? preparation for the induced bodily response
? body modiﬁcation ? sensing the body state ?
sensory representation of the body state ? feeling
As a variation, an ‘as if body loop’ uses a direct causal
relation
preparation for the induced bodily response ?
sensory representation of the body state
as a shortcut in the causal chain. The body loop (or as if
body loop) is extended to a recursive body loop (or
recursive as if body loop) by assuming that the preparation
of the bodily response is also affected by the state of
feeling the emotion:
feeling ? preparation for the bodily response
as an additional causal relation. Such recursiveness is also
assumed by Damasio (2003), as he notices that what is felt
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object, under control of the person:
The brain has a direct means to respond to the object
as feelings unfold because the object at the origin is
inside the body, rather than external to it. The brain
can act directly on the very object it is perceiving. It
can do so by modifying the state of the object, or by
altering the transmission of signals from it. The
object at the origin on the one hand, and the brain
map of that object on the other, can inﬂuence each
other in a sort of reverberative process that is not to
be found, for example, in the perception of an
external object. (…)
In other words, feelings are not a passive perception
or a ﬂash in time, especially not in the case of feel-
ings of joy and sorrow. For a while after an occasion
of such feelings begins – for seconds or for minutes –
there is a dynamic engagement of the body, almost
certainly in a repeated fashion, and a subsequent
dynamic variation of the perception. We perceive a
series of transitions. We sense an interplay, a give
and take. (Damasio 2003, pp. 91–92)
Thus the obtained model is based on reciprocal causation
relations between emotion felt and body states, as roughly
shown in Fig. 1.
Within the model presented in this paper both the bodily
response and the feeling are assigned a level or gradation,
expressed by a number, which is assumed dynamic; for
example, the strength of a smile and the extent of happi-
ness. The causal cycle is modelled as a positive feedback
loop, triggered by a belief and converging to a certain level
of feeling and body state. Here in each round of the cycle
the next body state has a level that is affected by both the
belief and the level of the feeling state, and the next level
of the feeling is based on the level of the body state.
From feeling to believing
In an idealised rational agent the generation of beliefs
might only depend on informational sources and be fully
independent from non-informational aspects such as emo-
tions. However, in real life persons may, for example, have
a more optimistic or pessimistic character and affect their
beliefs in the sense that an optimist person strengthens
beliefs that have a positive feeling associated and a pessi-
mistic person strengthens beliefs with a negative associated
feeling. Thus the strengths of beliefs may depend on non-
informational aspects of mental processes and related
personal characteristics. To model this for the case of
feelings a causal relation
feeling ? belief
can be added. This introduces a second recursive loop, as
shown in Fig. 2.
Given a causal path (by a body loop or as-if body loop)
making a connection from belief to feeling, from a neu-
rological perspective the existence of a connection back-
ward from feeling to belief may be considered plausible, as
due to the forward connection, neurons involved in the
belief and in the associated feeling will often be activated
simultaneously: whenever a certain belief is activated, the
induced emotional response will activate the feeling as
well. Therefore such a connection from feeling to belief
may be developed based on a general Hebbian learning
mechanism (Hebb 1949; Bi and Poo 2001) that strengthens
connections between neurons that are activated simulta-
neously, similar to what has been proposed for the emer-
gence of mirror neurons; e.g., Keysers and Perrett (2004)
and Keysers and Gazzola (2009). The mechanism by which
this takes place will be modelled in ‘‘Learning to believe
by feeling’’.
Another type of support for a connection from feeling to
belief can be found in Damasio’s Somatic Marker
Hypothesis (cf. Damasio 1994, 1996; Bechara and Dama-
sio 2005; Damasio 2003). This is a theory on decision
making which provides a central role to emotions felt. Each
decision option induces (via an emotional response) a
feeling which is used to mark the option. For example,
when a negative somatic marker is linked to a particular
option, it provides a negative feeling for that option.
Similarly, a positive somatic marker provides a positive
feeling for that option. Damasio describes the use of
somatic markers in the following way:
  feeling 
belief  body 
state 
sensed 
body state 
Fig. 1 Body loop induced by a belief
feeling 
belief 
body 
state
           body- 
      feeling 
 loop 
belief- 
    feeling 
 loop 
Fig. 2 The two recursive loops related to a belief
380 Cogn Neurodyn (2010) 4:377–394
123the somatic marker (..) forces attention on the nega-
tive outcome to which a given action may lead, and
functions as an automated alarm signal which says:
Beware of danger ahead if you choose the option
which leads to this outcome. The signal may lead you
to reject, immediately, the negative course of action
and thus make you choose among other alternatives.
(…) When a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed
instead, it becomes a beacon of incentive. (…)o n
occasion somatic markers may operate covertly
(without coming to consciousness) and may utilize an
‘as-if-loop’. (Damasio 1994, pp. 173–174)
Usually the Somatic Marker Hypothesis is applied to
provide endorsements or valuations for options for a
person’s actions. However, it may be considered plausible
that such a mechanism is applicable to valuations of
internal states such as beliefs as well.
The computational model for believing and feeling
Informally described theories or models in scientiﬁc dis-
ciplines, for example, in biological or neurological con-
texts, often are formulated in terms of causal relationships
(e.g., Seth 2008), or dynamical relationships between states
as described in dynamical systems (e.g., Port and van
Gelder 1995). In particular, this applies to what was dis-
cussed in ‘‘From believing to feeling and vice versa’’. To
obtain a manageable explanation or model, it is convenient
to choose an appropriate abstraction level to express such
causal or dynamical relationships. Establishing these rela-
tionships in neurological context requires that timing
aspects of temporal associations between different neural
activations are to be taken into account (e.g., Wilmer et al.
2010). To adequately formalise such theories or models the
hybrid dynamic modelling language LEADSTO has been
developed that subsumes qualitative and quantitative cau-
sal modelling approaches, and dynamical systems model-
ling approaches (cf. Bosse et al. 2007a). This language has
been proven successful in a number of contexts, varying
from biochemical processes that make up the dynamics of
cell behaviour (cf. Jonker et al. 2008) to neurological and
cognitive processes (e.g., Bosse et al. 2007b, c, 2008).
Within LEADSTO the temporal relation
a { b
denotes that whenever a state property a occurs (for
example, the fact that the activation level of a certain
neuron or group of neurons has a certain value), then after a
certain time delay, state property b (for example, the fact
that the activation level of another neuron or group of
neurons has a certain value) will occur. This time delay (for
example, the step size Dt in discrete forms of differential
equations) can be speciﬁed for each relation instance as any
positive real number. In the hybrid language LEADSTO
both logical and numerical calculations can be speciﬁed in
an integrated manner, and a dedicated software environ-
ment is available to support speciﬁcation and simulation.
An overview of the agent model for believing and
feeling is depicted in Fig. 3. The detailed speciﬁcations of
the agent model are presented below. The picture also
shows representations from the detailed speciﬁcations.
However, note that the precise numerical relations between
the indicated variables V shown are not expressed in the
picture in Fig. 3, but in the detailed speciﬁcations of
properties below. Here capitals are used for variables, and
lower case letters for speciﬁc instances. To support repro-
ducibility and reusability of the model in the hybrid causal
modelling style used in the work reported in this paper (and
for those more accustomed to this type of format), in Boxes
1 and 2, the detailed formal speciﬁcations in LEADSTO
format are included, labeled by LP1 to LP9 as also shown
in the picture.
First the part is presented that describes the basic
mechanisms to generate a belief state and the associated
emotional response. The ﬁrst dynamic property addresses
how properties of the world state can be sensed. Note that
the model enables the use of different world state proper-
ties at the same time, which can be sensed and processed
further. Therefore for world state properties the variable W
is used which can be used to range over speciﬁc instances.
For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that the world state
properties W that are modelled, can be observed.
LP1 Sensing a world state
If world state property W occurs of strength V
then a sensor state for W of strength V will occur
For the example scenario this dynamic property is used by
the agent to observe both the paper attached looking like a
charge and the paper type looking like an offer; to this end
the variable W is instantiated by speciﬁc instances
charge and offer. Note that to indicate that not only V
is a variable, but also W, the formal notation world_-
state(W, V) is used in Figs. 1 and 2 and in Boxes 1 and
2; this expression indicates that world state property W has
activation value or strenght V. This notation also could be
written (with the same meaning) alternatively as
world_state(W)(V) or world_stateW(V). The
same applies to other expressions involving world states W
or body states B. In Figs. 2 and 3 small letters w and b are
used to indicate speciﬁc instances.
From the sensor states, sensory representations are
generated according to the dynamic property LP2. Note
that also here it is speciﬁed as a general rule, for which in
Cogn Neurodyn (2010) 4:377–394 381
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above.
LP2 Generating a sensory representation for a sensed
world state
If a sensor state for world state property W with level
V occurs,
then a sensory representation for W with level V will
occur
Next the property is described that relates strengths of a
speciﬁc sensory representation of an instance w and a spe-
ciﬁc feeling of an instance b to the strength of the speciﬁc
belief on w, thereby using certain strengths of the connec-
tions involved. Here a connection strength x1 from sensory
representation to belief and x2 from feeling to belief is
assumed. So, note that this property will not hold univer-
sally for all instances of world states W and body states B.
In ‘‘Example simulation results of the interaction of
belief and feeling’’ it will be discussed how the connection
strength x2 is adapted by a Hebbian learning principle. A
function g(b1, x1, x2, V1, V2) is used for the way in which
activation levels V1 and V2 of sensory representation and
feeling are combined taking into account the connection
strengths. Here b1 is a parameter indicating the person’s
orientation for believing; value 0 indicates that the person
is reluctant to believe and 1 that the person is willing to
amplify the strength of his or her belief, whereas a value of
0.5 makes that the person takes the average values of the
two sources. Moreover, c1 is a parameter indicating the
person’s speed or ﬂexibility in change of a belief; here
value 0 indicates that the person will never change a belief,
and 1 that the person is immediately willing to change the
belief.
LP3 Generating a belief state for a feeling and a sensory
representation
If asensoryrepresentationforwwithstrengthV1occurs,
and the associated feeling of b has strength V2
and the belief for w has strength V3
and the connection from sensory representation to belief
of w has strength x1
and the connection from feeling b to belief of w has
strength x2
and b1 is the person’s orientation for believing
and c1 is the person’s ﬂexibility for beliefs
then after Dt the belief for w will have strength
V3 ? c1(g(b1, x1, x2, V1, V2) - V3) Dt
Note that this property can be written in differential
equation format as follows:
dV3=dt ¼ c1ðgðb1; x1; x2; V1; V2Þ V3Þ
with variable names for quantities as indicated in the
antecedent of property LP3 above. The resulting level for
the belief is calculated based on a function g(b1, x1, x2, V1,
V2) of the original levels. For the function g(b1, x1, x2, V1,
V2) the following was taken:
gðb1;x1;x2;V1;V2Þ¼b1ð1  ð 1   x1V1Þð1   x2V2ÞÞ
þð 1   b1Þx1x2V1V2
Note that this formula describes a weighted sum of two
cases. The most positive case considers the two source
values as strengthening each other, thereby staying under 1:
combining the imperfection rates (i.e., their deviation from
the value 1) 1-V1 and 1-V2 of them provides a decreased
rate of imperfection expressed by 1-(1-V1)(1-V2). The
most negative case considers the two source values in a
negative combination: combining the imperfections of
LP4 
LP6 
LP5
LP7 
LP8 LP9 
LP1  LP2 LP3
Fig. 3 A model for the
dynamics of believing and
feeling based on a body loop
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by V1V2. This function g(b1, x1, x2, V1, V2) can be
considered to play the role of a quadratic threshold
function, parameterised by b1. Note that for connection
strength x2 = 0 (no effect of feeling on belief) the formula
reduces to the following:
gðb1;x1;0;V1;V2Þ¼b1ð1  ð 1   x1V1ÞÞ ¼ b1x1V1
In the example simulations discussed in ‘‘Example
simulation results of the interaction of belief and feeling’’
the connection strength x1 has been set on 1.
Note that the function g in property LP3 (and also h in
property LP4 below) has been kept abstract, so that they can
easily be ﬁlled with speciﬁc functions different from the
functions used here. As an example, it would be quite well
possible to use, for example, a discrete threshold function
gðs;x1;x2;V1;V2Þ¼1i fx1V1
þ x2V2  s;and 0 otherwise
with s a threshold parameter, or a continuous logistic
threshold function
gðr;s;x1;x2;V1;V2Þ¼1=ð1 þ e rðx1V1þx2V2 sÞÞ
with r a steepness parameter and s a threshold parameter.
Dynamic property LP4 describes the (internal) emo-
tional state (see ‘‘From believing to feeling’’) as a response
to a speciﬁc belief on an instance w; this emotional state
has the form of the preparation for a speciﬁc bodily
Box 1 LEADSTO
speciﬁcations for the model,
part I: generating a belief and
preparation
LP1 sensing a world state
If world state property W occurs of strength V
then a sensor state for W of strength V will occur.
world_state(W, V) { sensor_state(W, V)
LP2 generating a sensory representation for a sensed world state
If a sensor state for world state property W with level V occurs,
then a sensory representation for W with level V will occur.
sensor_state(W, V) { srs(W, V)
LP3 generating a belief state for a feeling and a sensory representation
If a sensory representation for w with strength V1 occurs,
and the associated feeling of b has strength V2
and the belief for w has strength V3
and the connection from sensory representation to belief of w has strength x1
and the connection from feeling b to belief of w has strength x2
and b1 is the person’s orientation for believing
and c1 is the person’s ﬂexibility for beliefs
then after Dt the belief for w will have strength V3 ? c1(g(b1, x1, x2, V1, V2) - V3) Dt.
srs(w, V1) & feeling(b, V2) & belief(w, V3)&
has_connection_strength(srs(w), belief(w), x1)&
has_connection_strength(feeling(b), belief(w), x2)
{ belief(w, V3 ? c1 (g(b1, x1, x2,V 1,V2) - V3) Dt)
LP4 from belief and feeling to preparation of a body state
If belief w with strength V1 occurs
and feeling the associated body state b has strength V2
and the preparation state for b has strength V3
and the connection from belief of w to preparation for b has strength x3
and the connection from feeling b to preparation for b has strength x4
and b2 is the person’s orientation for emotional response
and c2 is the person’s ﬂexibility for bodily responses
then after Dt the preparation state for body state b will have strength V3 ? c2(h(b2, x3, x4,
V1, V2) - V3) Dt.
belief(w, V1) & feeling(b, V2) & preparation_state(b, V3)&
has_connection_strength(belief(w), preparation(b), x3)&
has_connection_strength(feeling(b), preparation(b), x4)
{ preparation_state(b, V3 ? c2(h(b2, x3, x4,V 1,V 2) - V3) Dt)
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state can be considered as an expressed, externally obser-
vable emotional state. Also this property does not hold for
all instances w and b. The resulting level for the prepara-
tion is calculated based on a function h(b2, x3, x4, V1, V2)
of the original levels. Here x3 is the connection strength
from belief to preparation and x4 from feeling to prepa-
ration. Moreover b2 is a parameter indicating the person’s
orientation for preparing responses; value 0 indicates that
the person is reluctant to respond and 1 that the person is
willing to amplify the strength of his or her response, and a
value of 0.5 makes that the person takes the average values
of the two sources. Moreover, c2 is a parameter indicating
the person’s speed or ﬂexibility in change of a preparation;
here value 0 indicates that the person will never change a
preparation, and 1 that the person is immediately willing to
change the preparation.
LP4 From belief and feeling to preparation of a body
state
If belief w with strength V1 occurs
and feeling the associated body state b has strength V2
and the preparation state for b has strength V3
and the connection from belief of w to preparation for b
has strength x3
and the connection from feeling b to preparation for b
has strength x4
and b2 is the person’s orientation for emotional
response
and c2 is the person’s ﬂexibility for bodily responses
then after Dt the preparation state for body state b will
have strength V3 ? c2(h(b2, x3, x4, V1, V2) - V3)
Dt
Note that this property can be written in differential
equation format as follows:
dV3=dt ¼ c2ðhðb2;x3;x4;V1;V2Þ   V3Þ
with variable names for quantities as indicated in the
antecedent of property LP4 above. For the function h(b2,
x3, x4, V1, V2) the following has been taken:
hðb2;x3;x4;V1;V2Þ¼b2ð1  ð 1   x3V1Þð1   x4V2ÞÞ
þð 1   b2Þx3x4V1V2
In the example simulations discussed in ‘‘Example
simulation results of the interaction of belief and feeling’’
the connection strengths x3 and x4 have been set on 1.
Dynamic properties LP5 to LP9 describe the body loop.
Like LP1 and LP2 they hold for all instances for variables
B and W.
Box 2 LEADSTO
speciﬁcations for the model,
part II: body loop and as-if body
loop
LP5 from preparation to effector state for body modiﬁcation
If preparation state for body state B occurs with level V,
then the effector state for body state B with level V will occur.
preparation_state(B, V) { effector_state(B, V)
LP6 from effector state to modiﬁed body state
If the effector state for body state B with level V occurs,
then the body state B with level V will occur.
effector_state(B, V) { body_state(B, V)
LP7 sensing a body state
If body state B with level V occurs,
then this body state B with level V will be sensed.
body_state(B, V) { sensor_state(B, V)
LP8 generating a sensory representation of a body state
If body state B with level V is sensed,
then a sensory representation for body state B with level V will occur.
sensor_state(B, V) { srs(B, V)
LP9 from sensory representation of body state to feeling
If a sensory representation for body state B with level V occurs,
then B is felt with level V.
srs(B, V) { feeling(B, V)
LP10 From preparation to sensory representation of a body state
If preparation state for body state B occurs with level V,
then a sensory representation for body state B with level V will occur.
preparation_state(B, V) { srs(B, V)
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123LP5 From preparation to effector state for body
modiﬁcation
If preparation state for body state B occurs with level
V,
then the effector state for body state B with level V will
occur
LP6 From effector state to modiﬁed body state
If the effector state for body state B with level
V occurs,
then the body state B with level V will occur
LP7 Sensing a body state
If body state B with level V occurs,
then this body state B with level V will be sensed
LP8 Generating a sensory representation of a body
state
If body state B with level V is sensed,
then a sensory representation for body state B with level
V will occur
LP9 From sensory representation of body state to
feeling
If a sensory representation for body state B with level
V occurs,
then B is felt with level V
Alternatively, dynamic properties LP5 to LP8 describing
the body loop can also be replaced by one dynamic prop-
erty LP10 describing an as-if body loop as follows; see
Fig. 4.
LP10 From preparation to sensory representation of a
body state
If preparation state for body state B occurs with level V,
then the effector state for body state B with level V will
occur
Example simulation results of the interaction of belief
and feeling
Based on the model described in the previous section, a
number of simulations have been performed. Some
example simulation traces are included in this section as
an illustration; see Figs. 5 and 6 (here the time delays
within the temporal LEADSTO relations were taken 1
time unit). In Fig. 5 two different traces are shown with
different personal characteristics as expressed by the
speciﬁc values of the parameters of the model. Note that
the scaling of the vertical axis differs per graph. For both
traces the world state shows the development of the
strength of the belief that the observed paper (observed
with a rather modest strength of 0.3) at the car is an offer.
Moreover both c1 = 0.6 and c2 = 0.6. Simulation trace 1
at the left hand side has b1 = 0.5 and b2 = 0.5, whereas
simulation trace 2 at the right hand side has b1 = 0.5 and
b2 = 1. Note that if no speciﬁc personality is kept in
mind, such choices of parameter values are to a certain
extent arbitrary. For example, the person modelled in
trace 2 depicted in Fig. 5 (with b2 = 1) has as a personal
characteristic a stronger tendency to let the feeling posi-
tively affect the strength of the belief than the person
modelled in trace 1 (with b2 = 0.5), as can be seen in the
ﬁgure.
In trace 1 the belief (and also the feeling) gets the same
strength as the stimulus, namely 0.3; here no effect of
the emotional response is observed. However, in trace 2 the
belief gets a higher strength (namely 0.65) due to the
stronger emotional response (with feeling getting strength
1). This shows how a belief can be affected in a substantial
manner by the feedback from the emotional response on
the belief.
In Fig. 6 the complete example scenario for the car
parking case discussed earlier is shown. Note that in the
upper part of this ﬁgure (and in Figs. 7, 8, 9), at the vertical
LP4 
LP10 
LP9 
LP1  LP2 LP3
Fig. 4 A model for the
dynamics of believing and
feeling based on an as-if body
loop
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123axis state properties are represented which can hold or not
at speciﬁc time points (represented at the horizontal axis).
A dark line indicates a time interval for which a state
property shown at the vertical axis holds, and a light line an
interval for which it does not hold. The world state shows
something that (from a distance) looks like a charge with
strength 0.8 until time point 225; this is indicated by the
ﬁfth dark line (for state property world_state(charge, 0.8))
in the upper part of Fig. 6. For this case b1 = 0.8 and
b2 = 0.4 was taken, which means a modest role for the
emotional response. The belief in a charge leads to an
increasingly strong emotional body state b1 and via the
related feeling, the belief reaches a strength a bit above 0.9.
However, having come closer to the car, after time point
225 the world state shows with strength 0.8 something that
is more like an offer, whereas the strength of the charge
Fig. 5 Two example traces: (1) b1 = 0.5 and b2 = 0.5, (2) b1 = 0.5 and b2 = 1
386 Cogn Neurodyn (2010) 4:377–394
123shown drops to 0.05, which also was the strength of the
offer before time point 225. As a consequence the belief in
a charge drops and based on a different emotion response
on the offer belief based on body state b2 the strength of
the belief in an offer increases until above 0.9.
Learning to believe by feeling
In ‘‘From believing to feeling and vice versa’’ the con-
nection from feeling to belief was motivated by Damasio’s
neurological theory called the Somatic Marker Hypothesis.
One of the elements of this theory is that somatic markers
depend on past experiences of the person. Within the agent
model introduced above this element is incorporated by
making the connection strength from feeling to believing
adaptive, dependent on beliefs and feelings experienced
over time. From a Hebbian neurological perspective (Hebb
1949), strengthening of a connection from feeling to belief
over time may be considered plausible, as neurons involved
in the belief and in the associated feeling will often be
activated simultaneously. Therefore such a connection
from feeling to belief may be developed and adapted based
on a Hebbian learning mechanism (Hebb 1949; Bi and Poo
2001; Gerstner and Kistler 2002): connections between
neurons that are activated simultaneously are strengthened,
similar to what has been proposed for the emergence of
mirror neurons in, e.g., Keysers and Perrett (2004), Keysers
and Gazzola (2009), see also Diwadkar et al. (2008).
Based on these considerations, in the agent model the
connection strength x is adapted using the following
Hebbian learning rule. It takes into account a maximal
connection strength 1, a learning rate g, and an extinction
rate f. A similar Hebbian learning rule can be found in
Gerstner and Kistler (2002, p. 406).
By the factor (1-x) the learning rule keeps the level of
x bounded by 1 (which could be replaced by any number),
as Hebbian learning without such a bound usually provides
instability. When extinction is neglected, the upward
changes during learning are proportional to both V1 and V2,
which in particular means that no learning takes place
whenever one of them is 0, and maximal learning takes
place when both are 1.
LP11 Hebbian learning rule
If the feeling of b has strength V1
and the belief for w has strength V2
and the connection from feeling b to belief of w has
strength x
and the learning rate from feeling b to belief of w is g
and the extinction rate from feeling b to belief of w is f
then after Dt the connection from feeling b to belief of w
will have strength x ? (gV1V2 (1 – x) - fx) Dt
feeling(b, V1) & belief(w, V2)&
has_connection_strength(b, w, x)&
has_learning_rate(b, w, g) & has_
extinction_rate(b, w, f)
{ has_connection_strength(b, w, x ?
(gV1V2 (1 - x) - fx) Dt)
Fig. 6 Trace for the car parking case with b1 = 0.8 and b2 = 0.4
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123Example simulation results for learning to believe
Based on the agent model described in the previous sec-
tion, a number of simulations have been performed. Some
example simulation traces are included in this section as an
illustration; see Figs. 7, 8 and 9 (the time delays within the
LEADSTO relations were taken 1 time unit). Here the
connection strengths x1, x3 and x4 have been set on 1, and
x2 is dynamic based on the Hebbian learning rule.
In Fig. 7, b1 = 0.95, b2 = 0.4, g = 0.02 and the
extinction rate f is 0.0002. The example trace in Fig. 7
shows how after learning of the connection from feeling to
belief, the strength of the belief substantially exceeds the
strength of the incoming stimulus (0.9 vs. 0.6).
Fig. 7 Example trace with a
number of learning phases
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123In Figs. 8 and 9 some example simulation traces are
showing how equilibria are reached for a constant envi-
ronment with settings as indicated in the upper part of the
ﬁgures. Note that, in contrast to the situation in Fig. 7
where the world is ﬂuctuating in providing information, in
Figs. 8 and 9 the same information from the world state is
constantly coming in, forever. Given this stable environ-
mental factor, all variables of the model stabelise as well:
Fig. 8 Approximated equilibrium for b1 = 1, b2 = 0.4 Fig. 9 Approximated equilibrium for b1 = 0.2, b2 = 0.9
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123they all will approximate their equilibrium value. The
equilibrium values reached in these traces illustrate the
outcomes of the mathematical analysis of equilibria that
will be presented in ‘‘Mathematical analysis’’.
Mathematical analysis
In the example simulations discussed in ‘‘Example simu-
lation results of the interaction of belief and feeling’’ it was
shown that for a time period with a constant environment,
the strengths of beliefs, body states and feelings reach a
stable equilibrium. By a mathematical analysis it can be
addressed which types of equilibria are possible. To this
end equations for equilibria can be determined from the
dynamical model equations for the belief and the prepa-
ration state level, which can be expressed as differential
equations (with b(t) the level of the belief, s(t) of the
stimulus, f(t) of the feeling, and p(t) of the preparation for
the body state at time t).
Non-adaptive case
First, for the sake of simplicity, the case of a ﬁxed con-
nection strength 1 from feeling to belief is addressed. The
following differential equations can be obtained.
db t ðÞ =dt ¼ c1ðb1 1   1   st ðÞ ðÞ 1   ft ðÞ ðÞ ðÞ
þð 1   b1Þst ðÞ ft ðÞ bt ðÞ Þ
dp t ðÞ =dt ¼c2ðb2 1   1   bt ðÞ ðÞ 1   ft ðÞ ðÞ ðÞ
þð 1   b2Þbt ðÞ ft ðÞ pt ðÞ Þ
To obtain equations for equilibria, constant values for all
variables are assumed (also the ones that are used as inputs
such as the stimuli). Then in all of the equations the
reference to time t can be left out, and in addition the
derivatives db(t)/dt and dp(t)/dt can be replaced by 0.
Assuming c1 and c2 nonzero, this leads to the following
equations.
b1 1   1   s ðÞ 1   f ðÞ ðÞ þ ð 1   b1Þsf   b ¼ 0
b2 1   1   b ðÞ 1   f ðÞ ðÞ þ ð 1   b2Þbf   p ¼ 0
As for an equilibrium it also holds that f = p, this results in
the following two equations in b, f, and s:
b1 1   1   s ðÞ 1   f ðÞ ðÞ þ ð 1   b1Þsf   b ¼ 0 ð1Þ
b2 1   1   b ðÞ 1   f ðÞ ðÞ þ ð 1   b2Þbf   f ¼ 0 ð2Þ
For the general case (1) can directly be used to express b in
f, s and b1. Using this, in (2) b can be replaced by this
expression in f, s and b1, which transforms (2) into a
quadratic equation in f with coefﬁcients in terms of s and
the parameters b1 and b2. Solving this quadratic equation
algebraically provides a complex expression for f in terms
of s, b1 and b2. Using this, by (1) also an expression for b in
terms of s, b1 and b2 can be found. As these expressions
become rather complex, only an overview for a number of
special cases is shown in Table 1 (for nine combinations of
values 0, 0.5 and 1 for both b1 and b2). For these cases the
Eqs. 1 and 2 can be substantially simpliﬁed as shown in the
second column (for Eq. 1) and second row (for Eq. 2).
As can be seen in this table, persons that are pessimistic
for believing (b1 = 0) and have a negative proﬁle in gen-
erating emotional responses (b2 = 0), reach a stable equi-
librium for which both the belief and the feeling have level
0. The opposite case occurs when a person is optimistic for
believing (b1 = 1) and has a positive proﬁle in generating
emotional responses (b2 = 1). Such a person reaches a
stable equilibrium for which both the belief and the feeling
have level 1. For cases where one of these b1 and b2 is 0
and the other one is 1, a stable equilibrium is reached
where the belief gets the same level as the stimulus:
b = s. When a person is in the middle between optimistic
and pessimistic for believing (b1 = 0.5), for the case of a
negative proﬁle in generating emotional responses the
stable belief reached gets half of the level of the stimulus,
whereas for the case of a positive proﬁle in generating
emotional responses the stable belief reached gets 0.5
above half of the level of the stimulus (which is the 0.65
Table 1 Overview of equilibria
for 9 non-adaptive cases of
parameter settings
b2 0 0.5 1
b1 f = 0 b = 1 b = ff = 1 b = 0
0 b = sf b = f = 0 b = f = s = 1 b = f = 0
or
b = f and s = 1
b = s
f = 1
b = s = 0
or
b = f = 0
0.5 b = (s ? f)/2 b = s/2
f = 0
b = f = s = 1 b = f = sb = (s ? 1)/2
f = 1
b = f = s = 0
11 - b = (1 - s)
(1 - f)
b = s
f = 0
b = f = 1
or
b = s = 1
b = f = 1
or
b = f and s = 0
b = f = 1 b = f = s = 0
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123shown in the second trace in Fig. 5). This clearly shows the
effect of the feeling on the belief. The case where both
b1 = 0.5 and b2 = 0.5 is illustrated in the ﬁrst trace in
Fig. 5: b = f = s.
Adaptive case
Next the adaptive case is addressed where the connection
strength is not kept rigid, but is also changing during the
process of reaching an equilibrium; as part of this process,
it reaches its own equilibrium. The example simulations in
Figs. 8 and 9 show how for a time period with a constant
environment with strength 0.5, the strengths of beliefs,
body states and feelings and connection between feeling
and belief reach a stable equilibrium. For this case the
following differential equations can be obtained.
db t ðÞ =dt ¼ c1ðb1ð1  ð 1   x1st ð ÞÞð1   x2 t ðÞ ft ð ÞÞÞ
þð 1   b1Þx1x2 t ðÞ st ðÞ ft ðÞ bt ðÞ Þ
dp t ðÞ =dt ¼ c2ðb2ð1  ð 1   x3bt ð ÞÞð1   x4ft ðÞ ft ð ÞÞÞ
þð 1   b2Þx3x4bt ðÞ ft ðÞ pt ðÞ Þ
dx2 t ðÞ =dt ¼ð gbt ðÞ ft ðÞ ð 1   x2 t ðÞ Þ fx2 t ðÞ Þ
Note that below, as in ‘‘Example simulation results for
learning to believe’’ the connection strengths x1, x3 and
x4 are taken 1. Moreover, x2 is denoted as x. Assuming
c1, c2, f and g nonzero, this leads to the following
equations.
b1ð1   1   s ðÞ ð 1   xfÞ Þþð 1   b1Þxsf   b ¼0
b2 1   1   b ðÞ 1   f ðÞ ðÞ þ ð 1   b2Þbf   p ¼0
gbfð1   xÞ fx ¼0
As for an equilibrium it also holds that f = p, this results in
the following equations in b, f, x, s:
b1ð1   1   s ðÞ ð 1   xfÞ Þþð 1   b1Þxsf   b ¼ 0 ð3Þ
b2 1   1   b ðÞ 1   f ðÞ ðÞ þ ð 1   b2Þbf   f ¼ 0 ð4Þ
gbfð1   xÞ fx ¼ 0 ð5Þ
Note that as an extreme case b = f = s = 0 satisﬁes (3),
(4) and (5). For the general case, ﬁrst, Eq. 5 can be
rewritten into
gbf   xgbf   fx ¼0
xðgbf þ fÞ¼ gbf
x ¼
gbf
gbf þ f
x ¼
1
1 þ f
gbf
where the last step only applies when b, f = 0. Using b,
f B 1 from this it follows that
x  
1
1 þ
f
g
\1
This shows that given the extinction, the maximal
connection strength will be lower than 1, but may be close
to 1 when the extinction rate is very small compared to the
learning rate. However, it also depends on the equilibrium
values for f and b. For values of f and b that are 1 or close
to 1, this maximal value of x can be approximated. When
in contrast these values are low, also the equilibrium value
for x will be low, since:
x ¼
gbf
gbf þ f
 
gbf
f
In particular, when one of b and f is 0 then also x is 0 (and
conversely).
For the general case Eq. 3 can directly be used to
express b in f, x, s and b1. Using this, in (4) b can be
replaced by this expression in f, x, s and b1, which trans-
forms (4) into a quadratic equation in f with coefﬁcients in
terms of s, x and the parameters b1 and b2. Solving this
quadratic equation algebraically provides a complex
expression for f in terms of s, x, b1 and b2. Using this, by
(3) also an expression for b in terms of s, x, b1 and b2 can
be found.
Again only an overview for a number of special cases is
shown in Table 2. For these cases the Eqs. 3 and 4 can be
substantially simpliﬁed as shown in the second column (for
Eq. 3) and second row (for Eq. 4). As can be seen in
Table 2, persons that have a low orientation for believing
(b1 = 0) and have a low proﬁle in generating emotional
responses (b2 = 0), have an equilibrium for which both the
belief and the feeling have level 0, and also x = 0. The
case where both b1 = 0.5 and b2 = 0.5 indicates an
equilibrium with b = f = s, and x = 1/(1 ? f/gs
2). Note
that in Table 2 for b1 = 1 and b2 nonzero, two equations in
x and b occur, which can be solved further to obtain more
complex explicit expressions for each of them.
Discussion
In this paper, ﬁrst an agent model was introduced incor-
porating the reciprocal interaction between believing and
feeling based on neurological theories that address the role
of emotions and feelings. A belief usually triggers an
emotional response. Conversely, a belief may not only
depend on information obtained, but also on this emotional
response, as, for example, shown in literature such as Eich
et al. (2000), Forgas et al. (2005, 2009), Niedenthal (2007),
Schooler and Eich (2000). In the literature, this phenome-
non has been studied informally but no formal computa-
tional models have been developed, as far as the authors
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123know. Accordingly, this paper reports an attempt to
develop a formal computational model of how a belief
generates an emotional response that is felt, and on the
other hand how the emotion that is felt affects the belief.
For feeling the emotion, based on elements taken from
Damasio (1999, 2003), and Bosse et al. (2008), a con-
verging recursive body loop is included in the model. As a
second loop the model includes a converging feedback
loop for the interaction between feeling and belief. Both
the strength of the belief and of the feeling emerge as a
result of the dynamic pattern generated by the combination
of the two loops.
The causal relation from feeling to belief in this second
loop was inspired by the Somatic Marker Hypothesis
described in Damasio (1994, 1996), Bechara and Damasio
(2005), and may also be justiﬁed by a Hebbian learning
principle (cf. Hebb 1949; Bi and Poo 2001), as also has been
done for the functioning of mirror neurons; e.g., Keysers
and Perrett (2004), Keysers and Gazzola (2009). To for-
malise this adaptive process, a model for the connection
from feeling to belief was developed based on a Hebbian
learning rule (cf. Hebb 1949; Bi and Poo 2001; Gerstner and
Kistler 2002; Xie and Seung 2003). The resulting adaptive
model on the one hand describes how a belief generates an
emotional response that is felt, and on the other hand how a
connection can emerge enabling that the emotion that is felt
affects the strength of the belief. The models were speciﬁed
in the hybrid dynamic modelling language LEADSTO, and
simulations were performed in its software environment (cf.
Bosse et al. 2007a). A mathematical analysis of the equi-
libria of the models was discussed.
In the literature much support can be found for the idea
that emotions or moods may affect beliefs. One example is
the citation from Frijda et al. (2000b) in the introduction
section. Other forms of support, also empirically, can be
found in literature such as Forgas (1995, 2000), Clore and
Gasper (2000), Clark and Brissette (2000), Eich et al.
(2000), Forgas et al. (2005, 2009), Niedenthal (2007),
Schooler and Eich (2000), Brun et al. (2008), Dolan
(2002), Frijda et al. (2000a), LaBar and Cabeza (2006),
Pessoa (2008), Phelps (2006), and Storbeck and Clore
(2007). In principle the model is able to show patterns of
effects of emotions on beliefs, which are qualitatively
similar to patterns that have been reported for speciﬁc
circumstances in literature, which can be viewed as a
rough, qualitative kind of validation of the model.
However, in humans the effect of emotion or mood on
belief is not always the same; a more differentiated point of
view is put forward, for example, by Forgas (2000):
Numerous mundane everyday experiences are capa-
ble of inducing affect. (…) Such everyday moods
often have a mood-congruent inﬂuence on many
cognitive tasks (…) The cognitive consequences of
moods are neither simple, nor straightforward, how-
ever. While numerous studies found a clear pattern of
mood congruence in thoughts and judgements, many
other experiments fail to ﬁnd mood congruence, and
even report an opposite, mood-incongruent effect on
cognitions. (see Forgas 1995, for a detailed review)
(Forgas 2000, p. 109)
Given such differentiations, a more speciﬁc validation of
the model is a challenge on its own, involving a number of
nontrivial aspects (including the issue of quantitative
comparison: how strong is the effect on a belief), and
aspects of subjective personal contextual situations and
personal characteristics. For example, consider the situa-
tion that two persons A and B both are in contact with a
third person C, and both desparately try to persuade her to
have an exclusive relationship with them. Moreover,
Table 2 Overview of equilibria for nine adaptive cases of parameter settings for b1 and b2
b2 0 0.5 1
b1 f = 0 b = 1 b = ff = 1 b = 0
0 b = xsf b = f = x = 0– b = f = x = 0 b = xs
f = 1
x = 0o rx ¼ 1  
f
gs
b = x = 0
0.5 b = (s ? f)/2 b = s/2
f = x = 0
b = f = s = 1
x ¼ 1
1þ
f
g
b = f = s
x ¼ 1
1þ
f
gs2
b = (s ? 1)/2
f = 1
x ¼ 1
1þ
2f
gðsþ1Þ
b = f = s = x = 0
11 - b = (1 - s)(1 - xf) b = s
f = x = 0
b = f = x = 1
or
b = s = 1
x ¼ 1
1þ
f
gf
b = f
x ¼ 1
1þ
f
gb2
x ¼
1  s
b ðÞ
1 s
f = 1
x ¼ b s
1 s
x ¼ 1
1þ
f
gb
b = s =
x = 0
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123consider information a coming from a (not always reliable)
friend of C, stating that C intends to choose for A,
compared to information b that C intends to choose for B,
coming from the same person. Suppose for A and B’s
personal characteristics as a biases for beliefs associated
with positive resp. negative feelings are taken. Then, given
the different subjective contexts, and depending on A and
B’s personal characteristics, still all possible combinations
of beliefs on a or b for A and B may occur, see Table 3. For
example, if A has a bias for negative feelings, he will not
believe a, whereas in case B has a bias for negative
feelings, she will believe a. Only in case A has a positive
bias and B a negative bias, both will believe a, and in the
opposite case neither of them will believe a.
This toy example illustrates that a validation of any
model as a general mechanism for the interaction between
belief and feeling is far from trivial. Whether or not a
feeling will have effect on a belief depends on a combi-
nation of different types of factors, among which person-
ality aspects and subjective contextual aspects (in
particular, including what the fact to be believed means for
the person). Any experimental setup for validation has to
deal with these combinatorics of individual and contextual
differences. As this is a challenge on its own, a detailed
validation of the model has not been conducted yet. Such a
validation will be addressed as part of planned future work.
One of the speciﬁc challenges here is to provide estimated
values for the parameters representing individual person-
ality characteristics (for example, the parameters b1 and b2,
which represent a form of positive or negative orientation,
and c1 and c2, which represent the speed or ﬂexibility by
which beliefs are changed). Experience with this issue for
other models has shown the feasibility of an automated (on
the ﬂy) parameter tuning approach; for example, see Bosse
et al. (2009), and Both et al. (2009). Furthermore, as a next
step it will be explored how the presented model can be
integrated within a software agent model in order to obtain
a human-aware ambient agent that is able to estimate how a
person’s beliefs are affected both by information received
and emotional responses.
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